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IN THIS
ISSUE... - Nuclear
Engineering Professor Questions Feds' Commitment to Yucca
Mountain
- Outrage of the Week
Nuclear
Engineering Professor Questions Feds' Commitment to Yucca
Mountain A University of Michigan
nuclear engineering professor is questioning the validity of the federal
government's studies that claim the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
repository 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas is geologically safe for the
long-term disposal of 70,000 metric tons of high-level nuclear
waste.
In fact,
Rodney C. Ewing -- whose
multidisciplinary expertise also spans geology and materials science -- is
so disturbed by the results of a 20-year U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
study that he is writing a book due in early 2004 which will focus on
Yucca Mountain's many unresolved technical issues.
In the March
2003 edition of Scientific
American magazine, Ewing states his belief that the amount of
research DOE has performed at Yucca Mountain -- based on findings from
75,000 feet of core samples and 18,000 geologic and water specimens
retrieved from the site -- are "not the way you measure good science, any
more than you judge the merits of a book by the number of words." He
also believes the federal government is tailoring regulations to fit Yucca
Mountain, instead of choosing a site that meets existing nuclear waste
disposal policies.
Ewing is one
of Yucca Mountains' most knowledgeable and credible critics, having served
on the Yucca Mountain peer-review panel. According to Scientific
American, Ewing believes that the mass of information collected by
DOE at Yucca Mountain generates more questions than it answers.
"We've
learned a lot about this mountain, but when you look at the substance of
it, our knowledge is actually quite thin," Ewing told the magazine.
The crux of the DOE's Yucca
Mountain risk evaluation is a computer calculation that attempts to
predict the fate of nuclear waste buried there for thousands of
years. Because this "probabilistic performance assessment" found no
potential flaws, DOE pushed for development of Yucca Mountain and, in
2002, the Bush administration and Congress approved the site. DOE is
expected to file for a construction permit by late 2004, after which the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will have four years to determine the
repository's future; with NRC approval, DOE can then begin construction.
However, Ewing believes there are
myriad problems associated with the government's exclusive investment in
Yucca Mountain. Primarily, he argues that the DOE has changed the
rules of the game to fit the site. Most notably, DOE abandoned the
long-standing, traditionally-held geologic disposal philosophy of "defense
in depth," which relies on favorable geology and engineered barriers to
isolate nuclear wastes. Instead, DOE adopted site-specific standards to
meet the needs of Yucca Mountain.
"Instead of devising a regulation
and finding a site that meets it," Ewing said, "we picked a site and made
a regulation for it."
Ewing also
cited other examples where the government's research has fallen short of
addressing the dangers of storing nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain.
For example, he said the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
designation of 18 kilometers (about 11 miles) as the point for measuring
radioactive exposure is too distant from the source, and that the
10,000-year limit for measurements is too short as exposures likely will
peak millenia later.
"We should do the analysis first to
find out when the peak dose occurs, rather than setting the time limit in
advance," he said.
Geologic
variables as potential seismic and volcanic activity are inadequately
addressed, Ewing said, adding that long-term corrosion rates for Alloy 22,
a relatively untested metal which is being proposed for containers that
will store nuclear wastes at Yucca Mountain, are difficult to
predict.
"We're betting on a new material about which we know little,
while making optimistic assumptions about its behavior under conditions we
can only guess at," Ewing said. "Uncertainties throughout the model are
rolled together, which makes it hard to tell whether any of the barriers
are effective."
Despite his concerns over Yucca
Mountain, Ewing -- according to Scientific American -- maintains
his belief in the validity of geologic waste disposal and nuclear
power. He supports the underground Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in New Mexico (Ewing served on the project's review panel), where
work started in 1999 after 20 years of study. Contrasting WIPP to
Yucca Mountain, Ewing said nuclear wastes at the New Mexico facility are
not as "hot," meaning a much smaller amount of radioactivity will
ultimately be stored there. While reducing the possibility of
thermal problems, the geology at WIPP also is much simpler than Yucca
Mountain, meaning there are fewer issues related to water and potential
seismic and volcanic activity, according to Ewing.
As the Yucca Mountain project
progresses, Ewing sees little opportunity for further scientific input at
the site. "The game is not rigged like a crooked card game, but the lack of
choice at every step drives us inexorably to Yucca Mountain," he
said.
However, Ewing has not
halted his battle against the project: In collaboration with geologist
Allison Macfarlane of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he is
writing a book due in 2004 about the government's failure to adequately
address scientific issues associated with Yucca
Mountain.
(Editor's note: The complete profile of Prof. Rodney
C. Ewing can be viewed by visiting http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=0004CF54-4981-1E40-89E0809EC588EEDF&catID=2) |
Outrage of the
Week
Desperate to
show that there will be minimal effects on the rest of the country from
deadly spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste shipments to a
Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) is actively engaged in a misinformation campaign to purposely
mislead decision makers, local officials, and the public about the true
magnitude of such a shipping campaign.
In news
releases, a newly published fact sheet, and public pronouncements, DOE
officials claim that only 175 shipments per year, all of them by rail,
will be needed to move spent fuel and high-level waste to Nevada.
This figure is not only unsupported by any evidence, it is also the latest
of DOE’s big lies with regard to nuclear waste transportation.
And a cruel
lie it is, because by intentionally downplaying the risks and impacts to
states and local communities along national nuclear waste shipping routes,
it denies public safety and emergency preparedness officials information
that is essential for protecting citizens and the environment from these
deadly shipments.
Lest anyone
believe DOE is not intentionally low-balling the shipment numbers for
political reasons, a glance at the Yucca Mountain environmental impact
statement (EIS) is all that’s required. In analyzing the most
optimistic, lowest volume shipping scenario in the February 2002 EIS, DOE
estimated the minimal number of rail shipments at 10,725 over a 24 year
period. That’s 447 per year. If all waste is moved to Yucca
Mountain, not just the statutory 70,000 metric tons, the minimum number of
shipments estimated in the EIS jumps to 22,057, or 580 per year for 38
years.
But wait, that’s only part of
the story. To use rail as the primary mode of shipment, DOE will
need to make more than 3,000 barge shipments from reactors that do not
have rail access in order to get the waste to the nearest railhead.
Then there’s the little matter of rail access to Yucca Mountain
itself.
Interestingly, there is no rail
line Yucca Mountain. The nearest railroad is
more than 100 miles away. Because of geographic considerations and
the lack of access through the rapidly growing Las Vegas metro area, any
new rail spur to Yucca Mountain will involve 300 to more than 400 miles of
new rail construction and cost more that a billion dollars.
Given
financial, engineering, and environmental constraints, it is unlikely that
DOE will ever be able to develop direct rail access to Yucca
Mountain. Proposals for using heavy-haul trucks to ship the waste
from railheads to the repository are considered to be even more infeasible
and costly, even by some of the DOE consultants who analyzed them for the
EIS.
That leaves
only one option for getting spent fuel and high level waste to Yucca
Mountain: Legal weight trucks on the nation’s highways. Best
case scenario: 52,786 shipments over a 24 year period (2,199 per
year) or 108,500 shipments over 38 years (2,855 per year) impacting 43
states and thousands of cities across the country, none of which are
prepared to deal with the consequences. No wonder DOE wants to hide
the true magnitude of Yucca Mountain shipments.
In testimony
before Congress last summer, DOE acknowledged that it had no plan for
transporting spent fuel and high-level waste to Yucca Mountain. The
“plan” that has emerged since then seems to be aimed at keeping people in
the dark for as long as possible and making up “facts” as you go along,
depending on the perceived political needs at the time.
We welcome comments and story
ideas for this newsletter. For media information, please contact
Tom Bradley, Brown & Partners, at (702) 967-2222 or via
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