Summary of Yucca Mountain Oversight and Impact Assessment Findings

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

FINDINGS FROM THE AGENCY'S TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

• Key Site Suitability Issues
• Findings from Engineering Oversight
• Findings from On-Site Monitoring
• Findings from Environmental Oversight
• Summary

FINDINGS FROM SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES

• Summary

FINDINGS FROM THE AGENCY'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE TRANSPORTATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES

• Summary

INTRODUCTION

The Agency for Nuclear Projects is charged with carrying out State responsibilities for overseeing the federal government's high-level radioactive waste program and its impacts on the State and its citizens. Agency activities fall into three broad categories which, although separated for organizational and planning purposes are, in practice, substantially interrelated. These categories include: (1) technical oversight and independent studies; (2) socioeconomic impact assessment and monitoring; and (3) high-level waste (HLW) transportation impact assessment and planning. The discussion below presents an aggregated and selective summary of the Agency's key findings to date. A more detailed and technically specific account of the findings can be found in the biannual Report on Agency Activities and Oversight of the U.S. Department of Energy's High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Program (January, 1997).

The Agency's oversight and assessment work is dictated by the broader imperatives of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the changing nature of the federal program, while developments nationally and in Nevada significantly influence Agency planning, work priorities, and resource allocation. Findings from Agency efforts bear directly on the policy guidance and recom- mendations provided to the Governor and Legislature by the Agency and the Commission on Nuclear Projects. This linkage between national program and policy developments, Agency activities, and State policy responses to the HLW program is a unique feature of the Agency's structure and function. It provides the State not only with high quality, flexible oversight and impact assessment capabilities, but also with the capacity to integrate policy and programs in a way that maximizes Nevada's ability to respond to changing circumstances and developments of importance to the State.

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FINDINGS FROM THE AGENCY'S TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Since its inception, the Agency has devoted a significant amount of time and resources to the technical oversight of the Department of Energy's (DOE) site characterization activities and the implementation of independent studies of key Yucca Mountain site suitability issues. Technical oversight has been focused in 4 principal areas that have been categorized as geotechnical, engineering, the environment, and on-site monitoring. The Agency's independent technical studies have been targeted towards geotechnical issues where significant site suitability questions exist.

In order for Yucca Mountain to meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing regulations and comply with federal health and safety standards, DOE will be required to demonstrate that the site will contain and isolate spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for at least 10,000 years. To assure that DOE adequately meets its burden of proof, the Agency designed and implemented a three-part technical program that involves review of DOE- generated reports and other materials, monitoring of all DOE research and related activities, and independent studies in areas where DOE's data or methods are considered inadequate. The objective of the Agency's program is to be knowledgeable in DOE's site characterization program, assess and evaluate DOE's technical conclusions relative to the site, and ultimately develop an independent assessment of the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a repository site.

The review activity involves active participation in DOE, NRC, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and other meetings and conferences where subjects pertinent to Yucca Mountain are discussed; participation in field reviews related to technical issues and/or on-going studies; formal review and comment on key program documents; and active participation in scientific working groups where technical subjects (such as geotechnical models and computer codes) that have application to Yucca Mountain are discussed and evaluated.

Daily on-site monitoring of DOE's site characterization field activities has been a key component of the Agency's oversight of the Yucca Mountain Project. Real time site monitoring allows the Agency to be up-to-date with respect to on-going activities, data being gathered, data collection and equipment problems, and in-the-field interpretations of site conditions. Monitoring also affords the Agency opportunities to observe and report questionable scientific techniques and practices, identify poor or questionable data, and discuss field-related problems with DOE researchers and technicians.

In 1983, the Agency developed a series of site issues deemed key for determining the suitability of the site and around which the Agency's independent technical studies were designed. These independent studies focused on issues that: (a) were not being addressed by DOE and its contractors; (b) were based on DOE or DOE contractor methods or results that were in question; or (c) were considered to be areas of study so critical that duplicative studies by the Agency were warranted.

The Agency's technical oversight program was initiated in 1984 with a thorough technical review of DOE's draft Environmental Assessment for Yucca Mountain. That review confirmed that the site suitability issues developed earlier were correctly focused. The search for and selection of scientific experts to begin independent studies focused on critical aspects of the suitability issues was initiated (endnote 1). The primary focus of the independent studies, which began in 1985, were faults and earthquakes, volcanic hazards, saturated and unsaturated zone hydrology, and mineral resource potential. As new issues arose at Yucca Mountain - such as the potential for air movement within the mountain to compromise waste isolation (pneumatic pathways), the possibility that geothermal water might be forced into the repository by interacting underground forces (hydrothermal fluid intrusion), and the impacts of heat generated by spent fuel and high- level waste on waste isolation (thermal loading) - new studies were initiated.

Progress towards completion of the studies has varied over the years due changes in the amount of funds, changes in individual study direction based on data collected and analyzed, and changes in DOE's policies and willingness to cooperate with regard to site access and information sharing. Some studies had to be canceled as decreases in available funds required the Agency to make decisions on study priorities. In spite of these difficulties, the Agency's technical contractors have produced over 75 major technical reports. As of 1995, they had prepared and presented over 400 articles, papers, and abstracts for peer-reviewed scientific journals and conferences. A bibliography of peer-reviewed publications on Agency-sponsored research was prepared in 1994 (endnote 2).

In October 1995, DOE ceased to provide any new funds to the Agency for oversight of the high-level radioactive waste program. In response to the loss of funds, the Agency requested that all technical contractors bring their research to closure and submit final reports on their findings by the end of 1996. These reports will form the basis for follow-up work when and if sufficient resources become available and federal program developments require additional independent research efforts.

Key Site Suitability Issues

In 1954 and again in 1961, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that deep geologic disposal was the preferred method for safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste. A safe geologic disposal site was envisioned to be one with simple, stable geology, slow moving groundwater, compatible geochemistry, mineable rock quality, and little or no economic resource potential. Underground salt formations were determined to be the best geologic medium for disposal since salt was considered to most closely approximate the preferred waste isolation characteristics. In 1979, the DOE requested the National Academy of Sciences to provide its views on the potential of volcanic tuff as a geologic host medium for a repository (endnote 3). The Academy concluded that, while tuff appeared to have characteristics that would make it an acceptable host rock, there were some technical concerns that required resolution prior to siting a geologic repository in tuff. These concerns included active faulting in southern Nevada where tuff was being considered; the stability of fractured tuffs at elevated repository temperatures; the rapidity with which groundwater moved above the water table within highly fractured tuff; the potential for renewed volcanic activity; and the potential for exploitable natural resources attractive to future generations that could compromise waste isolation.

The concerns expressed by the Academy in 1979 were markedly similar to the critical site suitability issues for Yucca Mountain developed independently by the Agency and its technical advisors in 1983. The Agency's site suitability issues are as follows:

1. The potential for moisture and vapor moving through fractures in the mountain to transport radionuclides rapidly to the water table and from there into the accessible environment.

2. The potential for rapid movement of radionuclides from the aquifer beneath Yucca Mountain to the larger regional aquifer system.

3. The effects of future changes in climate - which are known to occur historically - on the geologic and hydrologic conditions of the site (including changes in the elevation of the water table, the amount of surface water infiltrating into and through the repository, etc.).

4. The potential for earthquakes and the movement of earthquake faults to compromise the integrity of the site.

5. The potential for future volcanic activity to directly or indirectly impact the waste isolation capabilities of the site, either through the intrusion of molten material into the repository or through renewed geothermal activity.

6. The likely effects of chemical (geochemical) processes and high temperature conditions on the integrity of the site.

7. The possible existence of valuable mineral resources (e.g., gold, silver, etc.), hydrocarbon resources (e.g., oil and gas), and geothermal resources that could result in future generations breaching the site in search of such resources (human intrusion).

Independent Agency research and the evaluation of DOE-generated data since 1985 indicate that the potentially disqualifying conditions identified by the National Academy of Sciences and the Agency do, in fact, exist at Yucca Mountain. Yucca Mountain can be characterized as being extremely complex geologically with fast flowing groundwater, an active tectonic environment (subject to earthquakes, fault movement, and volcanic eruptions), an oxidizing environment corrosive to many metals, rocks that are highly fractured and stressed to near failure, and being in a location within a geologic belt of gold and silver production. The Agency has concluded that, under DOE's own repository siting guidelines (10 CFR 960), Yucca Mountain should have been, and still should be, disqualified as a suitable location for a deep geologic repository.

The following sections describe some of the key technical findings about the site to date with respect to the site suitability issues discussed above. In addition, findings related to engineering, the environment, and on-site monitoring are presented. A complete discussion of the Agency's technical research can be found in the reports listed in the Bibliography of Agency Publications.

The Implications of Water and Vapor Movement Within Yucca Mountain

• Contrary to DOE assumptions, Agency research has determined that water moves very rapidly within Yucca Mountain through faults and fractures, and that this "fracture flow" is the predominant way water and water vapor travel through the mountain. This finding is contrary to DOE's assumption that water moves predominantly - and extremely slowly - by migrating through the rock pores (matrix flow). Since groundwater and possibly water vapors are the most likely means by which radionuclides would be transported from the repository to the accessible environment, the length of time it would take water to move through the site to the water table is a critical measure of site suitability. If all the unsaturated zone flow is restricted to matrix flow, travel times will likely be long (slow) and calculated in thousands of years. However, if there is fault/fracture flow (flow along faults or in interconnected fractures), travel time will likely be very short (rapid), calculated in terms of years or hundreds of years. Information, some even from DOE- sponsored studies, gathered from drillholes and from faults encountered along the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) tunnel and calculations from computer simulations all indicate that faults/fractures do, in fact, function as fast pathways for groundwater flow, permitting water from the surface to reach below the repository horizon in 50 years or less. Agency findings indicate that the site does not comply with the NRC regulation that groundwater travel time from the repository to the accessible environment cannot be less than 1,000 years.

• Agency research found that air and moisture (water vapor) move upward through Yucca Mountain. This "pneumatic" characteristic of the mountain by which air is forced upward through faults and fractures is one of the significant findings of the Agency's technical program. It is important because spent nuclear fuel contains gaseous radionuclides that, once a canister is breached, can be readily transported to the surface if fractures within the mountain are open (unobstructed) and connected vertically. This results in numerous "pneumatic pathways" by which radionuclides can be emitted into the atmosphere, even if there is no physical breach in the repository itself. The existence of these pathways was first hypothesized by Agency researchers based on results of independent analyses of DOE data. It was later confirmed from information gathered through further Agency research, DOE drillholes, and datasets derived from the ESF tunnel.

• The underground area above the water table know as the unsaturated zone contains perched water (pockets of water that have been cut off from the water table). Until recently, perched water had been thought to be rare or possibly absent under Yucca Mountain. Since 1992, when dry drilling techniques were first used at the site, six drillholes have encountered perched water. Agency researchers now believe perched water may be everywhere in the repository area. The existence of perched water poses problems in terms of how such water will act when subjected to the high temperatures of a repository and how such conditions will interact with changes to future, wetter (pluvial) climate changes and tectonic events (earthquakes, fault movement, volcanic activity).

• Agency research has concluded that DOE's present moisture and vapor flow models do not represent the site's natural conditions (endnote 4). Site characterization strategies and site performance assessments have suffered and continue to suffer from overly optimistic conceptual flow models and unsupported assumptions of moisture movement in the absence of site-specific hydrologic data. Alternative flow models based on site databases have been put forth by the Agency and its contractors, but have been routinely ignored or dismissed by DOE.

Regional Aquifer System

• Agency research has concluded that, like water movement in the unsaturated area of the mountain, water within the water table (i.e., in the saturated zone) also moves rapidly along faults and fractures. This finding means that once radionuclides reach the water table, they will be transported relatively rapidly toward areas where they could contaminate water sources used for drinking and agriculture. Various datasets and computer simulations used by the Agency suggest that faults and fractures control the flow of groundwater through the rock underlying the site. Evidence also suggests that the processes at work are dynamic (active) rather than static (stationary), meaning that they have the potential to change rapidly in reaction to tectonic processes (e.g., changes caused by earthquakes, movement of faults, and/or volcanic activity). The conclusion is that the potential for fault/fracture zones to move groundwater and rapidly transport contaminants is high.

• Agency studies have found that tectonic processes significantly influence regional hydrologic systems. This means that earthquakes and/or movement of faults may adjust the properties of groundwater flow systems, or create new fault or fracture zones that could lead to a realignment of groundwater flow conduits. A review of regional water level data following the 1992 Little Skull Mountain earthquake indicates that water level changes induced by earthquake/fault movement have caused changes in local flow gradients and flow directions that may increase or decrease groundwater travel time. The Agency has concluded that the ability to predict, with reasonable certainty, these hydrologic gradient changes and any effects on the regional aquifer system over geologic time is not possible with current technology.

• Agency research found that pumping of the regional carbonate aquifer could adversely impact a natural barrier to radionuclide migration at the site. Underlying the repository site is an extensive regional carbonate aquifer known to be highly permeable, transmissive (moving large amounts of underground water over large distances), and containing large quantities of high quality water. Should radioactive contaminants reach the carbonate aquifer, they could, in a relatively short time period (several thousand years), appear in water supply wells in Amargosa Valley and in springs in Death Valley. Limited site information suggests that the upward hydraulic pressure that exists in the carbonate aquifer is considered a natural barrier to downward contaminant migration. Significant water supply pumping in Amargosa Valley or a large climate change to significantly drier conditions have been postulated as scenarios that could adversely affect this potential barrier to radionuclide migration into the carbonate aquifer.

Future Climate Variations

• Agency studies suggest that pluvial (wetter) climatic conditions will reoccur within the repository's design life. A shift to a pluvial climate characterized by cooler temperatures and significant and persistent increases in rainfall will likely result in increased infiltration of water into the subsurface, increased groundwater flow velocities, and higher water table levels. Rock geochemistry studies, investigations of ancient spring deposits, studies of evidence of past water in presently dry washes, and models of past climate changes all suggest that wetter conditions will reoccur at the site. Should this pluvial climate occur at the repository at a time when the area has been heated to high temperatures due to the emplacement of waste, changes to natural and engineered barriers (some possibly adverse) are likely and not predictable with any reasonable degree of certainty.

Fault and Earthquake Hazard

• Research confirms that a fault and earthquake hazard exists at the site. A repository sited in a seismically active area is vulnerable to damage and possible loss of isolation capability from seismic events and fault movement. It is the conclusion of Agency earthquake researchers that a magnitude 6.5 - 7.0 earthquake is likely in the vicinity of the site in the next 10,000 years. Of the 33 known Quaternary faults (less than two million years old) in the vicinity of the site, at least five of these faults contain observed volcanic ash, thus providing evidence of a contemporaneous (closely spaced in time) volcanic eruption at Lathrop Wells volcano south of the site with a fault rupture event at the site. Apart from the potential for direct damage to the repository and waste packages, earthquakes cause faults to move and have the potential to result in changes in water tables, to initiate volcanic or geothermal activity, and to drastically alter the hydrologic and geologic conditions at the site.

• The Agency's work has contributed to the finding that the tectonics of Yucca Mountain are complex. There is considerable scientific debate over which tectonic model (i.e., which conceptualization of site-specific conditions) appropriately represents the site's complexity. Much of this debate is based on the recognized uncertainties and gaps in knowledge about the geology and tectonics in the region. Resolution of the debate appears unlikely in the near future, and without resolution, it is not possible to predict with any certainty how waste isolation can be impacted by tectonic processes, something that will make licensing a repository at Yucca Mountain difficult, if not impossible.

Volcanic Hazard

• Agency researchers have found that, contrary to DOE assumptions, a volcanic eruption is probable within the repository design life. Five volcanic centers are located within 10 miles of the site. Also, geophysical studies suggest that there are buried volcanic features beneath the site. Evidence developed by numerous researchers has concluded that the probability of renewed volcanic activity in the Yucca Mountain area is real, but the exact location of this future activity cannot be predicted.

Geochemical and Thermal Conditions

• An important finding that bears directly on Yucca Mountain's waste isolation capability is that volcanic tuffs are unstable at elevated temperatures. The volcanic tuffs beneath Yucca Mountain are locally altered to zeolites and clays that form layers underneath the tuff layer designated as the repository host rock. Chemical properties of zeolite minerals allow them to act as a natural barrier to the migration of radionuclides in water by absorbing the radionuclides. However, these zeolites have been found to be unstable at elevated temperatures (above 100 C). As a result, zeolites will not absorb radionuclides at the above-boiling temperatures the repository is expected to generate. Thus, research indicates that zeolites may not be a natural barrier to the migration of radionuclides as DOE assumes, and DOE models for predicting repository waste isolation performance may be seriously deficient as a result.

• Agency research clearly demonstrates the existence of past episodes of geothermal intrusion within Yucca Mountain and the proposed repository host rock. It is widely recognized by the scientific community that in tectonically active areas, such as around Yucca Mountain, tectonic processes (earthquakes and faulting) can be accompanied by upward intrusions of highly mineralized thermal fluids from deep within the earth. Evidence developed from site investigations suggests that such mineralized thermal fluids have invaded Yucca Mountain on numerous occasions in the geologic past. Any future return of those hydrothermal fluids could have significant and potentially catastrophic effects on repository integrity and radioactive waste isolation. While Agency findings in this regard are compelling, DOE has sought to close consideration of this issue based on earlier and seriously incomplete information and analyses.

• The heat generated by the spent fuel and high-level waste in the repository (i.e., the thermal load) could result in adverse impacts on waste isolation. Agency-sponsored research on the effects of thermal loading concluded that above-boiling rock temperatures in the repository will redistribute rock silica minerals to reform the tuff rock matrix and fracture pathways into "hydrothermal funnels" that could focus future water infiltration directly onto nuclear waste packages. DOE's repository design assumes a "hot" facility where temperatures are maintained above the boiling point of water for up to 1,000 years. This is intended to permit more waste to be placed in the limited space available and to "dry out" the area around the waste packages to keep water from eroding the waste package material. However, Agency research suggests that the overall effects of such a thermal loading strategy could impair waste isolation in the long run.

Natural Resource Potential

• Agency research has shown that "indicator" minerals suggesting the presence of precious metals (e.g., gold and silver) that could attract future exploration/extraction activities are present at Yucca Mountain. Agency-sponsored studies of mineralization at and near the site have found trace quantities of gold and silver that could, in some future time, be attractive for further exploration. The greatest uncertainty in assessing the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site may be the potential for human intrusion into the repository caused by the search for valuable natural resources. The evidence to date suggests that the potential for valuable mineral resources in the immediate area surrounding Yucca Mountain must be recognized, along with the potential for resulting human interference and intrusion of the repository.

• While the actual potential for future oil and/or gas production at or near Yucca Mountain is presently unknown, Agency researchers have found rocks known to be hydrocarbon source rocks in areas surrounding the site. No deep wells have been drilled to determine the presence or absence of source rocks beneath the site, so the potential remains unknown.

• Agency studies have concluded that the potential for exploitable geothermal resources appears low. There are no hot or warm springs at the site, and the geothermal gradient measured in site wells suggests that high-temperature water is unlikely at economic geothermal production depths. However, there is evidence of historic geothermal activity on and under Yucca Mountain, therefore, the possibility of future geothermal exploration in the area cannot be ruled out.

Findings from Engineering Oversight

• The choice of a thermal load for the repository is a key decision in the waste management system. It will influence all aspects of the system, including if and how long the spent fuel should be aged before disposal, the size and design of the repository, and the design of the waste package. While the DOE program has yet to look at alternative thermal load choices in a comprehensive technical manner, it continues to make program decisions that have the effect of driving the repository temperature strategy toward long-term above-boiling thermal loads. The Agency, as a result of its oversight and independent review activities, has concluded that DOE is making critical and irreversible decisions about repository thermal loads that could have negative impacts on other components of the waste management system and on public health and safety and the environment.

• Nuclear criticality (endnote 5)occurs when neutrons from "fissionable" radioactive materials (such as certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium) bombard each other with such repetition that they spark a runaway "chain reaction." Some scientists have suggested, based on theoretical calculations, that highly radioactive waste emplaced in a Yucca Mountain repository could, under certain circumstances, reach nuclear criticality and possibly explode. The criticality is reached when fissionable materials released from the waste containers are concentrated in high silica rock like the volcanic tuff at Yucca Mountain. The Agency and the NRC are concerned about the potential of repository nuclear criticality and its effects on public health and safety and the environment. Agency technical personnel do not believe that DOE has adequately assessed the potential for such an event, is not properly considering criticality control in its waste package design, and is not incorporating the issue into repository performance models that will be used for assessing repository risks.

Findings from On-Site Monitoring

• The Agency's on-site monitoring program has concluded that there is an unwarranted air of optimism among DOE program managers and contractors regarding Yucca Mountain's underground conditions - an optimism that is unsubstantiated by the findings of DOE's limited analysis of tunnel-generated data. The DOE view is that, because a five-mile tunnel can be mined in volcanic tuff, then it must be an acceptable site for a repository. Agency on-site monitors have questioned whether any characterization data from the exploratory tunnel, especially hydrology and rock mechanics information from test alcoves and heater test data from the thermal alcove, will be factored into the repository viability decision because either the data will not be available at the time the decision is made or because what data there is will be ignored.

• Agency oversight has concluded that the Exploratory Studies Facility tunneling emphasis continues to be on "showing progress" of mining completion by deferring scientific work in test alcoves or totally eliminating test alcoves that were in the original ESF design as required. The original ESF design called for 44 test alcoves and a core test area consisting of 8,400 feet of tunnel containing numerous alcoves and supporting facilities for scientific investigations. Currently (as of the end of 1996), the revised ESF design identifies only seven alcoves and no core test area.

• The unexpected highly-fractured nature of the host rock at the repository level presents unique challenges for the design, construction, and operation of a repository in a high temperature, poor rock quality environment. Initial Agency analyses of the conditions encountered in the first 4 ½ miles of the ESF loop indicates that the fractured nature of the rock, if it is present (as is likely) in the rest of the repository block, will create major problems for modeling waste isolation performance and will add greatly to the cost of constructing the more than 120 miles of tunnels needed to emplace the volume of waste that is intended.

Findings from Environmental Oversight

• Many environmental activities within the Yucca Mountain project address routine regulatory compliance matters. These requirements are enforced and monitored by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and include stipulations applying to air and water quality, radioactivity, and hazardous wastes. The Agency's environmental oversight program has determined that DOE is typically in conformance with environmental regulations and the associated standards.

• A joint environmental baseline and impact assessment program principally provides descriptive biological information for use by DOE in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance process for the Yucca Mountain project. The Agency has found that DOE's study design and statistical approach to be erroneous, subjective, and without scientific credibility. DOE's approach has also been the subject of similar criticism from others (endnote 6).

• Two other environmental studies at Yucca Mountain mandated by the federal Endangered Species Act and the Federal Land Management Policy Act consist of basic ecological investigations. The Agency found that both of these studies are credible activities yielding good scientific information on little known ecological aspects of southern Nevada (endnote7).

• In 1993, the White House Office of Environmental Policy called for federal agencies to adopt "a proactive approach to ensuring a sustainable economy and a sustainable environment through ecosystem management." While policies designed to foster the concepts and practices embodied by achieving sustainable development through applied ecosystem management have been established by the Secretary of Energy and have been adopted for the Nevada Test Site, the Agency has found that the Yucca Mountain project so far has refused to acknowledge and implement these policies. In a program with the long time span that characterizes the Yucca Mountain project, incorporating resource and ecosystem management as integral elements of all program activities is crucial to long- term protection of the environment.

• The Agency's environmental oversight program has found that DOE has not approached the NEPA (endnote 8) process in a substantively scientific manner. Instead, DOE views NEPA matters as procedural rather than having scientific and technical significance. DOE's NEPA studies are, without exception, ill conceived and lack scientific credibility. Environmental professionals and the Agency's environmental oversight personnel have openly criticized the project for failing to recognize the scientific requirements of NEPA. In the Agency's view, missing from DOE's environmental program for Yucca Mountain is the competent professionalism needed for applying concepts of holistic, integrated, and interdisciplinary science suitable for addressing environmental threat to future human generations.

SUMMARY

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FINDINGS FROM SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES

The Agency for Nuclear Projects formally initiated a study of the socioeconomic impacts of a proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in 1986 after the Nevada site had been chosen for study as a potential waste disposal site. The State study recognized that the effort would need to go well beyond what was traditionally considered adequate for socioeconomic impact assessment because of the unique nature of the repository project and the challenges posed by this first of a kind undertaking. Between 1987 and 1996, the State's study produced over 200 reports and work products, in addition to numerous publications in scientific and academic literature. The work has been overseen by a Technical Review Committee comprised of nationally regarded experts in various socioeconomic disciplines. A complete and in-depth treatment of the impact studies and their findings can be found in the three major summary reports on the Nevada socioeconomic studies published in 1989, 1993, and 1995, respectively (endnote 9). In addition, two major books dealing with the policy implication of the findings of Nevada's socioeconomic research have been published by the Agency's study team (endnote 10). The Agency's Technical Review Committee has also issued two reports of its findings with respect to the studies, and a summary of the Nevada research was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (endnote 11).

The federal high-level waste program presented the Agency's socioeconomic research team (endnote 12) with many challenges. The unique nature of a repository facility; the potential for stigmatization and its implications; the uncertain schedules; public risk perceptions and consequent behavioral responses; the highly charged political atmosphere; and the need to develop new and innovative research approaches have had to be addressed and dealt with in the design and implementation of research at every step in the process. The Agency's work assessed social and economic impacts not only by collecting and analyzing data, but by developing new ways of understanding the factors that motivate responses to high-level radioactive waste and the repository program. The research effort strongly argues for the recognition of the critical importance of socioeconomic factors and impacts in evaluating the nation's efforts to site a repository. The overall conclusion is that the federal government is not prepared at the present time to address the effects of such a project on society, and that it will have to do so in new and effective ways to solve the nuclear waste problems presented by public opposition and resistance to such facilities.

The Agency's research has developed a convincing body of evidence that indicates the greatest potential socioeconomic threat from the proposed repository stems from what has been termed the "special effects" of the project. These are impacts related to intense negative perceptions and stigma associated by the public with a high-level radioactive waste repository, combined with the unique vulnerability of the Nevada economy to changes in its public image. Because of the high profile nature of the whole nuclear waste disposal program, the potential exists for Nevada to become associated with these negative perceptions to the detriment of its ability to attract tourists, conventions, in-migrants, and diversified new industry to the state. This is especially troublesome in the event of a nuclear waste accident in or near Las Vegas that might stigmatize the area and cause visitors to stay away in significant numbers. The work to date demonstrates that Nevada is uniquely vulnerable to such stigmatizing effects because of its tourism-dependent economy and State revenue structure. Some key findings that relate to this overall conclusion are as follows:

• The primary economic concern for Nevada comes from the potential impacts of stigma on the tourist and visitor industry. Such impacts could produce significant losses to an economy dominated by visitor-based revenues. The unique importance of the visitor and tourist industry for Nevada and Las Vegas required a major effort to understand the potential for stigma impacts.

• Studies indicated that populations important to Nevada's economic well-being may be highly sensitive to the radioactive risks associated with a repository and spent fuel/HLW transportation, and that the attractiveness of the state as a place to visit, move to, or invest in could be negatively impacted.

• Research results provided evidence that a repository could have an adverse impact on Nevada's tourism economy. First, the research found that people associate "special" facilities with the places they are located (e.g., nuclear-weapons testing and related nuclear imagery was associated with Nevada), suggesting that the repository might also become associated with Nevada and/or Las Vegas if it is located at Yucca Mountain. Second, a nuclear-waste storage facility consistently evokes extremely negative imagery. Third, the presence of negative imagery has a dampening effect on a person's propensity to visit a place. Respondents reported lower preferences for vacationing, attending conventions, moving, or starting a business when the target place had high negative imagery scores. Fourth, the presence of nuclear-related imagery produced a much lower preference for Nevada as a vacation site.

• Research found that convention planners are averse to holding a convention in a city near a repository. Even under a benign (i.e., no accident) condition, one-third of the planners surveyed reduced their preference for Las Vegas. This figure increased when planners were presented with scenarios in which the repository program experienced a series of accidents or events.

• A 1988 survey of 400 members of the National Association of Corporate Real Estate Executives found that, in making decisions about business location, the existence of a repository within 100 miles of a community would detract substantially from its suitability as a location for administrative offices, business and professional services, and businesses to serve the hospitality industry. Fifty-two percent (52%) rated "a site adjacent to a highway leading to an underground facility for disposing of radioactive waste" as a "very influential" negative factor in making a location decision.

• These stigma effects are potentially of significant magnitude. In the event of a radioactive waste accident or incident that caused Las Vegas to become commonly and negatively associated with radioactive imagery, behavioral responses in terms of the visitor economy, in-migration, and economic development could result in substantial negative impacts. Estimates of 5, 10, and 20 percent or larger reductions in key economic sectors are not inconsistent with the empirical evidence gathered.

• A one percent drop in visitors in the year 2010 (endnote 13) would result in a decline of about $155 million in spending in the Las Vegas area; a five percent decline would mean a decline of more than $775 million; a ten percent decline would mean a decline of over $1.5 billion. (For comparison, the recession of 1980 and 1981 resulted in Las Vegas visitor declines of about 1% for 1980 and 1.5% for 1981.)

• The research suggests that for each one percent drop in tourism, State revenues would be reduced by approximately $7 million and employment in Clark County would drop by approximately 7,000 jobs (endnote 14).

• Under current State tax laws, repository-related increases in population cost the State and local governments more for providing public services than they provide in revenues, and that difference is between $670 and $1,000 per person, per year (endnote 15). This is a consequence of the "standard effects" of the project and is separate from any stigma-induced economic effects that may occur during the life of the program.

• Repository-related stigma effects, depending on their scale and character, could have wrenching effects on Nevada's state and local government systems. Changes in the economic base (e.g., visitor-gaming), service population (e.g., residential and nonresidential land use and income), or population distribution could have significant effects on government facility and service systems, and even on the institutional arrangements for delivery of public facilities and services. Government systems that depend on visitor-generated revenues and are geared for growth could find it particularly difficult to adapt to declining revenues.

• The repository project, even if it were not accompanied by risk/stigma effects, would act as a net drain on the State General Fund. The positive revenue effects would derive chiefly from the state sales and use tax. On the average, General Fund revenues under the standard effects future would increase by about $1.8 million annually during site characterization, $5 million annually during repository construction, and about $1.5 million annually during emplacement. However, economic modeling done as part of the Agency's research in 1989 found that additional General Fund expenditures required as a result of the repository-related population increases would be approximately $4 million during site characterization, $9.6 million during construction, and about $3.1 million during emplacement with almost half of the additional expenditures made for educational purposes (primarily the Distributive School Fund). The net projected fiscal shortfall is estimated at about $21.7 million during site characterization, $27.3 million during construction, and $40.5 million during emplacement.

• The estimated costs outlined for a sample of state agencies identified as potentially most affected by the repository project, excluding the Department of Transportation, total from about $85 million to over $156 million through the year 2010 of the repository time schedule. The costs to the Department of Transportation could reach over $800 million when all necessary route segments are included (endnote 16). Other state agencies still need to be studied, the repository project description needs to be more clearly and specifically articulated by DOE, agency responses need to be clarified, and management strategies need to be developed before a final impact assessment can be completed.

• Consistently over three-quarters of Nevadans oppose the Yucca Mountain project in repeated surveys taken since 1987. They support strong state opposition to the repository program even if this means giving up potential economic benefits. The research found that even direct cash payments would not induce respondents to support the repository.

SUMMARY

FINDINGS FROM THE AGENCY'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE TRANSPORTATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES

The transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository site in southern Nevada has the potential to impact communities throughout Nevada and across the nation. Depending upon assumptions made about the mix of shipping modes (rail and highway), handling and shipping capabilities at points of origin (e.g., reactor sites), size of the shipping canister or cask, and other factors yet to be determined, a Yucca Mountain repository, if constructed and opened, would receive between 18,800 and 92,000 shipments of spent fuel from civilian nuclear power plants and high-level radioactive waste from DOE weapons facilities. The repository would also receive an unknown number of shipments of so-called "miscellaneous wastes requiring geologic disposal." Studies by the Agency indicate that 43 states and 109 cities with populations over 100,000 would be directly impacted by SNF and HLW shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.

Waste transportation decisions in Nevada (e.g., routing, ports of entry, etc.) will have implications for communities throughout the country, just as decisions made in other states and communities will significantly impact how HLW transportation affects Nevada and Nevada's citizens. Transportation issues remain extremely important to the State and local communities and may well be the most visible and dramatic "driver" of potential repository impacts for Nevada.

Transportation studies undertaken by the Agency involved two interrelated purposes: to characterize the transportation conditions and risks specific to Nevada and to understand national HLW transportation issues and conditions and their implications for Nevada. The following represents a summary of important findings of the Agency's decade-long transportation study effort. More complete treatment of the transportation work can be found in the various summary reports and transportation reports published by the Agency and its researchers.

• The number and type of shipments remain undefined more than 13 years after the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. In the absence of accurate and useful DOE information, the Agency carried out a comprehensive analysis examining the effects of three scenarios set as bounding conditions. These scenarios included a current capabilities case, a Multi- Purpose Canister (MPC) base case, and an idealized maximum rail case (endnote 18). The analysis showed a wide variation in the potential number of shipments. Under the "current capabilities" case, there could be as many as 12,636 rail shipments plus 79,345 highway shipments. For the "MPC base case," 13,916 rail and up to 26,093 highway shipments would be needed. For the "maximum rail" scenario, there would be 16,792 rail shipments plus up to 4,722 highway shipments.

• The consequences of a worse case accident are poorly understood. Analysis of existing literature by Agency researchers concluded that a credible worse case accident releasing less than 1% of the contents of a shipping cask could cost over $600 million to clean up in a rural area and several billion dollars in an urban area. Without full-scale testing, shipping cask performance is, of itself, an area of significant uncertainty. Moreover, the new shipping cask designs proposed by DOE create new opportunities for human error and thereby increase the uncertainties associated with spent fuel and HLW transportation. The longer shipping distances required because of Yucca Mountain's location (more than 2,200 miles on average compared to 600 miles for past shipments) will create additional opportunities for equipment failures and human errors.

• Agency research has identified rail as the safest mode of waste transportation assuming the use of dedicated trains (short trains carrying three to five cask cars and no other cargo) operating under "special train" safety protocols, early identification of cross- country rail routes, early stakeholder participation in transportation system planning by corridor states, and adequate funding for safety inspections and emergency preparedness. However, spent fuel and HLW that is shipped in general commerce (i.e., mixed in with other cargoes on standard freight trains) would pose significant logistical problems and increased risks, and such shipments are opposed by the Association of American Railroads. DOE has not agreed to any of the proposed rail safety recommendations.

• DOE has not specified the national routes that would be used to ship spent fuel and high- level waste to any Nevada facility. Regardless of what national routing scheme is finally decided upon by DOE, the State of Nevada would be significantly impacted. Potential impacts on the Las Vegas Valley are of particular concern. Absent action by the State of Nevada to designate alternative highway routes (endnote 19), all of the legal weight truck shipments would go through the Las Vegas Valley. Depending on whether and where a rail spur to Yucca Mountain is constructed - or if an intermodal transfer facility is located at Caliente as proposed in recent congressional legislation - at least 9% and as much as 100% of rail shipments would be routed through Las Vegas (endnote 20). If an intermodal facility is constructed, the Las Vegas Valley could also be impacted by heavy haul truck shipments from Caliente or from a transfer facility located near Nellis Air Force Base or near Arden.

• Of four primary highway routes studied, the three that traverse the Las Vegas Valley (I- 15 from California, I-15 from Utah, and I-15 to Craig Road) have a similar potential for much greater direct impacts on residents and on difficult-to-evacuate groups than does the Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) B route that goes through Ely, Tonopah, Goldfield, and Beatty. The ten-mile corridors along the I-15 and US 95 routes through Las Vegas each contain more than 500,000 Nevadans, or over one-third of the State's population. The ten-mile corridor along the NDOT A Route (I-15 to Craig Road) has a resident population of over 260,000, while the NDOT B Route has a population of 14,000.

• Two of the Las Vegas Valley routes also have significant potential for direct impacts on large numbers of nonresidents, such as conventioneers, sightseers, and casino visitors. The estimated nonresident population of the ten-mile corridors along both the I-15 and US 95 routes is over 300,000 and includes all the major hotels and casinos of the Las Vegas Strip. Indeed, the estimated nonresident population within the one-mile corridoralong I-15 from California is over 110,000 and almost 315,000 within the two-mile corridor. Such concentrations of visitors near primary highway routes have special significance for evacuation planning and for assessment of stigma socioeconomic impacts based on perceived risk and are subject to risk amplification.

• Prior to 1994, DOE had identified three potential rail spur routes in Nevada: a Caliente route; a Jean route; and a Carlin route. Detailed analysis has been performed on only the Caliente option, and DOE has no plans to study others in more detail in the near term. The Caliente route would require the construction of 360 miles of new track from the Union Pacific main line north of Caliente along a circuitous route to Yucca Mountain. The cost would be between $1 billion and $1.4 billion (in 1990 dollars). DOE's analysis indicated there would be significant engineering challenges and environmental hurdles involved with this spur construction.

• The difficulty of constructing rail access to Yucca Mountain should not be under- estimated. Construction of any of DOE's three options would be the longest new rail project in the United States since the 1930s. The Agency has concluded that the feasibility of direct rail access to the Nevada Test Site or Yucca Mountain cannot be confidently assumed until DOE demonstrates that one or more routes are not only technically feasible from an engineering standpoint, but also are environmentally, economically, and politically viable.

• Agency research found that the location of an intermodal transfer facility in Caliente will not eliminate rail shipments of nuclear waste through downtown Las Vegas. Using standard routing models similar to those used by the railroads, Agency researchers found that at least 1,150 rail casks (9 percent of the total under the current capabilities scenario) would be delivered to Caliente via the Union Pacific mainline through Las Vegas. If most rail shipments from the eastern United States enter Nevada from California, an increasingly likely prospect following the Burlington Northern-Santa Fe and Union Pacific-Southern Pacific railroad mergers, Las Vegas could be traversed by as many as 11,700 rail casks (over 69 percent of the total under the maximum rail scenario) en route to Caliente. Moreover, operation of an intermodal transfer facility in Caliente could result in an additional 12,600 to 16,800 oversized heavy haul truck shipments within Nevada.

• Initial scoping research conducted by Agency contractors concluded that nuclear waste shipments are more vulnerable to terrorist attack than previously thought (endnote 21). Studies sponsored by the NRC in the early 1980s found that terrorists using a high energy explosive device could breach a shipping cask and release one percent of the cask's contents. The type of terrorism (domestic as well as international), the methods that might be employed, and the weapons available to terrorist groups have changed markedly over the past 15 years. As a result, the risks of terrorist action - and the consequences of such action - against spent fuel or HLW shipments may be much greater than current estimates.

• The Agency found that NRC underestimated the potential health effects of an attack resulting in a release and that NRC did not evaluate either the standard economic impacts nor the perceived risk-driven socioeconomic impacts of an attack resulting in a release. Agency research has identified major areas of uncertainty requiring further evaluation of terrorist attack consequences by NRC and DOE. In particular, Agency research concluded that the NRC should reexamine its earlier proposal to reduce counter terrorism regulations and should reverse its proposal to eliminate the requirement that armed guards escort shipments through highly populated areas.

SUMMARY

Endnotes

1. Scientific experts selected to conduct the independent studies included academic researchers from the University of Nevada - Reno, University of Nevada - Las Vegas, Desert Research Institute, as well as respected consultants from within and outside the State.

2. M. Johnson, 1994, "Bibliography of Publications Related to Nevada-Sponsored Research of the Proposed Yucca Mountain High-Level Radioactive Waste Repository Site Through 1994", Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, NWPO-TR-021-94.

3. Letter from E. F. Gloyna, National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences, to S. Meyers, Office of Waste Management, Department of Energy, April 23, 1979.

4. Such models are important because they will be used by DOE to predict how the site will perform in isolating waste for the 10,000 years required. If DOE uses models that do not reflect real conditions, the results as to whether or not Yucca Mountain can isolate waste from the environment will be skewed. DOE's insistence on using models that reflect slow water movement conditions appear driven by the necessity to keep groundwater travel times within required bounds, something the actual conditions at the site do not support.

5. When nuclear material goes "critical", it generates a great deal of heat and, under certain circumstances, can cause an explosion - as in the case of a nuclear bomb. The criticality concern with respect to high-level waste in a repository is that the material might somehow become concentrated enough in the proper configuration to begin generating heat, creating steam and pressure that could result in a breach of isolation or cause an explosion.

6. See, for example, NWTRB (U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board) 1994, "Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy: January to December 1993", NWTRB, Arlington, VA; and C. R. Malone, "Ecology, Ethics, and Professional Practice: The Yucca Mountain, Nevada Project as a Case Study" in The Environmental Professional (1995).

7. (1) "Secondary Plant Succession on Disturbed Sites at Yucca Mountain," DOE, 1995; and (2) "Diet of Desert Tortoises at Yucca Mountain and Implications for Habitat Reclamation," DOE, 1996.

8. See, for example, "The Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and Type-I and Type-II Errors," by J. Lemons, K. Shrader-Frechette and C. Conner; and "The Federal Ecosystem Management Initiative in the U.S.," by C. Malone in Prospects for Science and Ethics (due for publication in 1997).

9. Ref. (1) "An Interim Report on the State of Nevada Socioeconomic Studies," (June, 1989); (2)"State of Nevada Socioeconomic Studies of Yucca Mountain 1986 - 1992: An Annotated Guide and Research Summary," (June 1993); and (3) "State of Nevada Socioeconomic Studies Biannual Report: 1993 - 1995," (June, 1995).

10. Ref. One Hundred Centuries of Solitude, by James Flynn, et al., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado (1995); and The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository, by D. Easterling and H. Kunreuther, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1995).

11. Ref. "Interim Statement of the Technical Review Committee on the Yucca Mountain Socioeconomic Project," by G. F. White, et al. (January, 1990); "Nuclear Waste's Human Dimension," by K. Erikson, et al., in Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy, Fall, 1994; and "Socioeconomic Studies of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal," in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 91, pp. 10786 - 10789, November, 1994.

12. The study team for the State socioeconomic program is comprised of respected academic researchers and consultants from around the country. The team was originally put together as a result of the extensive planning process that preceded the awarding of the contract for the effort in 1986. While members have been added and deleted over the years, the core group of researchers has remained with the program. Represented on the team are experts in an array of socioeconomic disciplines from the Nevada universities, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Clark University, Arizona State University, University of Oregon, the University of South Florida, Utah State University, and consultants from the private sector.

13. The year 2010 was used in the modeling exercise since it is a point in time when the risks from transportation, packaging, handling, and storage could be present.

14. These figures are expressed in terms of 1989 dollars and use 1988 employment baseline projections. It is likely that projections would result in larger losses/reductions if calculated and expressed using more recent data.

15. The dependence of Nevada state and local jurisdictions on revenue contributions of visitors is unique and results from the fiscal structure of the state. Other economic developments, private or public, that do not expand the contributions of visitor spending also will have negative fiscal impacts. Public expenditures per person would have to be provided for repository-related population in excess of the revenues that these people would contributed through taxes, fees, etc. This means that, in the absence of payments made by DOE for mitigation or compensation, or changes in the Nevada tax/revenue structure, the repository program will consistently produce significant negative fiscal impacts even without negative stigma-related effects.

16. This analysis was initially done in 1989 and updated for certain agencies in 1990 and 1992. Subsequent changes in the proposed federal program (such as the addition of heavy haul transport along state highways) will likely increase the costs to State agencies substantially from the figures reported here.

17. A listing of Agency transportation reports is contained in the "List of Agency Publications" included as an appendix to this report.

18. The "current capabilities case" assumed that shipments would occur to an interim storage facility in the near term (i.e., beginning in 2000) and would be constrained by currently available shipping canisters and handling/operational constraints at reactor sites. The "MPC base case" assumed that large, multiple purpose canisters would be supplied to utilities by DOE (a plan DOE has recently abandoned) and increases the utilization of rail shipments. The "maximum rail case" assumed that new, large rail shipping containers would be available and used by utilities who also have made needed infrastructure and related investments at reactor sites to handle rail casks rather than shipping by truck. All information used in the analyses was obtained from DOE and from reactor operators, railroads, etc. The full analysis is contained in the report, "The Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste: A Systematic Basis for Planning and Management at National, Regional, and Community Levels," by Planning Information Corporation (September, 1996).

19. Under federal law, states may designate alternative routes for transporting radioactive materials if those routes can be shown to be safer than the default routes - i.e., the interstate highway system. However, such designations do not automatically mean that shipments will follow state alternatives. Shippers can - and do - challenge such designations on the grounds that they impede commerce, especially if the alternative routes are significantly longer and require more time in transit - as would be the case with any Nevada alternative.

20. If an intermodal facility is located at Caliente, at least 9% of the waste would still be routed through Las Vegas. If the railroads use a southern routing strategy for operational and weather considerations, at least 68% of shipments would go through Las Vegas. If a rail spur is built at the proposed Valley, Jean, or Dike locations, 100% of the waste would traverse the Las Vegas Valley.

21. Ref. "A Preliminary Study of Sabotage and Terrorism as Transportation Risk Factors Associated with the Proposed Yucca Mountain High-Level Nuclear Waste Facility," by James David Ballard (September, 1996).